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ADVENTURES IN FINANCE 
Deborah A. DeMott* 
FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECON-
OMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY. By Merritt B. Fox. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 455. $45. 
Does corporate finance matter? That is, is the economic world of 
concrete transactions in goods and services much affected by the rari-
fied sphere of corporate capital structure and investment strategy? 
Some "persons on the street" (Main Street not Wall Street), inter-
viewed by the news media in the wake of the market collapse on Octo-
ber 19, 1987, responded that their personal economic spheres were 
self-evidently unaffected by Wall Street's difficulties, as they did not 
own stocks or bonds. Lest one dismiss this perspective too quickly as 
nai've or misguided, one should note its parallel in the assumptions of 
many academic theorists about corporate finance. They assume that a 
firm's value is determined solely by the ability of its assets to generate 
operating income. Thus the proportion of debt to equity in the firm's 
capital structure, as well as the use the firm makes of the financial 
results of its operations, are irrelevant to firm value. 1 Like "Main 
Street's" response to the market collapse, the irrelevance theorems 
may seem out of touch with the world as we know it, for they begin by 
assuming away, among other things, the existence of corporate income 
taxes and of transaction costs, including the cost of acquiring informa-
tion. In a world with taxes, a world in which the acquisition of infor-
mation is costly, and in which bankruptcy is not costless for firms' 
shareholders,2 capital structure and sources for project funding seem 
• Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. B.A. 1970, Swarthmore College; J.D. 
1973, New York University. - Ed. 
1. See generally v. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 372-73 (3d ed. 
1987). 
2. Some academic theorists assume that the irrelevance hypotheses apply as well in the bank-
ruptcy context to firms that have defaulted on their obligations to many creditors. If one begins 
with the assumption that questions of asset ownership are separable from questions of asset use, 
arguing that a creditor should sacrifice some of its ownership interest to enhance the post-reor-
ganization survival of the bankrupt firm is more difficult than it would be in the absence of such 
an assumption. See Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to War-
ren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (1987). Professor Baird's article characterizes "traditional 
bankruptcy scholars" as "alone in the academy in their belief that the financing decisions of a 
firm and its investment decisions are inseparable." Id. at 819-20. One explanation is that bank-
ruptcy scholars work in a context which belies the empirical credibility of the assumption that 
bankruptcy is a zero-cost event. Bankruptcy, scholars know that assets may be liquidated for less 
than their economic values and that the bankruptcy process imposes substantial legal and admin-
istrative costs. 
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likely to matter greatly. 
One of the most intriguing questions along these lines is the ade-
quacy of financial support for the development and production of in-
novative goods and services. Without innovation, economies stagnate. 
Stagnation may occur quickly or slowly and has several different as-
pects. Talented engineers and managers emigrate to more receptive 
climes. New products do not take the place of older ones no longer 
attractive to consumers. By providing new products, innovative com-
petitors, nurtured in other economies, succeed where the indigenous 
producers fail. Within this gloomy scenario, several aspects of corpo-
rate finance are possible villains. Innovative products and services 
originate in the ideas of individuals and groups of individuals. To de-
velop the idea into a proposal for a new product may require consider-
able time and effort. In some cases, but surely not all, individuals may 
be willing to undertake development activities without immediate 
compensation for the associated costs, looking to future gain as their 
reward. Further, the production of a new product typically requires 
funding from some source to pay for the use of factors essential to 
physical production. Funds for the development and production of 
new products can come from two basic sources. First, firms that have 
retained earnings from prior operations may invest them in the inno-
vative project. Second, funding may be obtained from diverse sources 
other than retained earnings, among them venture capital firms, 
banks, and wealthy individuals. Each of these sources may present 
obstacles to the financing of innovative products. 
If corporate managers systematically prefer to invest their com-
pany's retained earnings in projects generated internally, and if many 
innovative products do not originate with employees of firms with ex-
tensive retained earnings, some worthy projects may not find funding 
or sufficient funding. Indeed, the projects that managers choose to 
finance with "captive" funds may be systematically less innovative 
than the unfunded orphans, and in some instances may even promise 
less return than the funds would earn on average if distributed to the 
firm's shareholders as dividends and reinvested elsewhere by them. 
But greater dividend payments ought not to be assumed to be a pan-
acea for the consequences of overretention: At present United States 
taxpayers have a demonstrated proclivity for consuming rather than 
saving and investing monies that come into their hands,3 and it is not 
obvious why increased dividends would necessarily evoke a higher sav-
3. See Summers & Carroll, Why Is the U.S. National Savings So Low?, in 2 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON EcONOMIC ACTIVITY 607 (1987). Total capital formation in the United States is 
more comparable to the totals for other developed countries if the relevant measure is aggregate 
national savings rather than household savings. See Sheppard, Is the U.S. a Spendthrift Nation?, 
36 TAX NOTES 939 (1987). But such measures include spending on items that would not directly 
aid the funding of innovative products, such as educational services and all consumer durables. 
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ings rate.4 
Originators of innovative projects may, of course, tum to sources 
of funding other than established firms' retained earnings. Obstacles 
to success on this front are more diverse, and, for our present pur-
poses, need be sketched only briefly. First, many factors determine 
whether venture capital firms and investment and commercial banks 
have funds available for investment. In recent years the pool of funds 
available for investment in the United States has expanded and con-
tracted sharply as capital from foreign sources pushes into and then 
retreats from the seductive promises and perils of the United States 
economy. Various economic circumstances and social policies affect 
the amounts available for new investment by pooled investment vehi-
cles, like pension funds, life insurance companies, and mutual funds. 
Second, the types of investment possibilities that attract funding, and 
their relative attractiveness to different sources of funds, vary consid-
erably, often within a short period of time. Biotechnology start-ups, 
junk bonds, Brazilian debt, and triple A-rated municipal securities 
have all in recent years enjoyed and fallen out of favor with investors. 
And proponents of an innovative project may be unable to attract in-
vestment capital that is willing to forgo a current return for a long 
enough time to sustain the necessary period of cash drain associated 
with many new ventures. 5 
Regrettably, Professor Merritt B. Fox's Finance and Industrial 
Performance does not significantly advance our understanding of the 
role played by corporate finance in the nurture or demise of technolog-
ical innovation. The bulk of the book is an apparently diligent review 
of critiques of the neoclassical theory of finance, in aid of the author's 
thesis that the present finance process in the United States is systemat-
4. Empirical work by public finance economists suggests that the flow of capital income into 
individuals' hands has an effect on consumption and savings behavior. See Sandmo, The Effects 
of Taxation on Savings and Risk Taking, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcONOMICS 265, 283 (A. 
Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds. 1985). A related issue in this literature is whether the value of 
corporate assets is reflected in individual wealth, and thus whether the retention or distribution 
of corporate earnings affects personal consumption behavior. If consumers always "see through 
the corporate veil," the flow of capital income to them should have no effect on personal savings. 
Empirical results give qualified support to the view that consumers adjust personal savings to 
offset changes in corporate saving. Id. But see Poterba, Tax Policy and Corporate Saving, in 2 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 455, 502-03 (1987) (recent study estimating that 
effects of Tax Reform Act of 1986, by lowering corporate saving, will lower private saving as 
well). 
5. Current financing practices in the biotechnology industry are a good illustration. Some 
United States companies at present are willing to license their breakthrough technology to large 
Japanese companies despite the risk that these licensees are potential competitors. A biotechnol-
ogy company incurs heavy start-up costs and may easily fail, while any commercial success will 
be long delayed. These factors make traditional "venture capital" difficult to attract. Financing 
such companies through public offerings of their stock, always a high-risk undertaking, became 
even more difficult after the stock market crash depressed the price of biotechnology shares. In 
contrast, Japanese companies are perceived to be a relatively patient source of venture capital. 
See Wysocki, Japanese Now Target Another Field the U.S. Leads: Biotechnology, Wall St. J., Dec. 
17, 1987, at 1, col. 6. 
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ically deficient in its ability to ascertain and fund innovative projects 
that are deserving of support. The book's empirical data consists of a 
study of financing practices in the United States semiconductor indus-
try, ending in 1974. But the book omits any treatment of several fac-
tors crucial to achieving its ambitious goal. Finance and Industrial 
Performance concludes with a set of proposed policy prescriptions 
which cannot fairly be supported by the preceding discussion, due to 
the scope of omissions in it. These policy proposals include a proscrip-
tion on retention of earnings by corporate managers, integration of 
individual income taxes with corporate taxes, and application of the 
liabilities now confined to prospectuses and registration statements to 
all periodic disclosure mandated by the federal securities laws. 6 
For starters, nowhere in its 455 pages does Finance and Industrial 
Performance acknowledge that the economy of the United States is 
not, if it ever was, an isolated and self-contained system. The book 
thus omits any discussion of international capital flows into and out of 
this country as well as any treatment of competition in markets for 
goods and services between United States firms and foreign firms. 
This remarkable provincialism undercuts the book's usefulness not 
only in some large and obvious ways, but in some smaller and more 
technical respects as well. For example, the role that may be played 
by financial intermediaries Oike investment banks) is described as lim-
ited to two functions, speculation in existing investments and provid-
ing funds for new investment opportunities offered by new and existing 
firms. The latter function is characterized as "indispensable ... since 
firms almost never receive new funds from savers directly" (p. 151). 
Firms may, of course, raise funds "directly" from savers by selling 
securities to the investing public, a process in which investment banks 
play an underwriting role. Surely it is relevant that in other countries 
the public offering process is less burdensome for issuers than in the 
United States. Indeed, in Great Britain, public companies often suc-
ceed in raising large amounts of additional investment from their pres-
ent shareholders through "rights" offerings. As it happens, in recent 
years underwritten rights issues have been the prevailing method 
through which British companies raised funds in the capital markets 
6. A key aspect of this last proposal is requiring an investment banker to serve as a "disclo-
sure guarantor" even though the company is not undertaking a public offering, so as to enhance 
the incentives to disclose more rather than less information in periodic disclosure filings. Pp. 
365-67. Although Finance and Industrial Performance proposes that the issuer be prohibited or 
severely restricted in its ability to indemnify the investment banker against liabilities or to 
purchase insurance on behalf of the bank, it does not consider the fee the investment banker is 
likely to charge for serving as a "disclosure guarantor." This fee is likely to be set to enhance the 
banker's ability to self-insure against the legal risks of serving in that capacity. One would want 
to consider whether, by increasing the costs of remaining a public company subject to the SEC's 
periodic disclosure requirements, the proposal might e'nhance the incentives for going private, 
either through a buyout transaction or some other strategy to exit from this web of regulation. 
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to finance acquisitions of foreign companies. 7 
Another key omission is the savings rate issue I mentioned above. 
Clearly a proponent of change in permissible earnings retention of the 
sort advocated in Finance and Industrial Performance needs to present 
and defend some hypothesis about the likely extent to which enhanced 
dividend distributions will be saved rather than consumed by their re-
cipients. Indeed, an assumption that enhanced dividend payouts will 
be saved at the same rate or no lesser a rate than present payouts may 
be problematic. A large proportion of total financial assets in the 
United States are held by persons retired from the work force, who 
may spend more, not less, if their incomes are higher. 8 Empirical stud-
ies of the impact of tax changes on the rate of savings reach results 
that one scholar recently characterized as "inconclusive," illustrating 
the need for caution in assuming that income-enhancing changes will 
7. See Heleniak & Spera, Role of British Purchasers In Corporate Acquisitions, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 
7, 1987, at 31, col. 3. The reasons why British acquirors, but not their United States counter-
parts, can raise funds in the public equity markets to finance a proposed acquisition are of inter-
est. In the United States, if a proposed acquisition will have a significantly material impact on 
the acquiring company, and the acquiring company proposes to finance the acquisition through a 
public offering of securities, the SEC's Regulation S-X requires that the offeror's registration 
statement contain pro forma financial statements restating its prior financial results to show how 
the proposed acquisition might have affected them. The purpose of this requirement is to provide 
investors with information about the continuing impact of the proposed acquisition. Preparation 
of pro forma financial statements is time-consuming and generally impossible without access to 
the financial records of the acquisition's target. Thus, if the acquisition transaction is time-sensi-
tive (as it likely would be if a hostile tender offer is involved), the offeror is disabled from resort-
ing to the public markets for financing. As a result, acquiring companies in the United States 
tend to finance acquisitions through retained earnings or funds borrowed from a financial inter-
mediary. If the proposed acquisition occurs, however, the indebtedness incurred to finance it 
may be retired through a public offering of securities. 
In contrast, a successful rights offering enables a British offeror to finance its acquisition 
initially through the public offering proceeds. Rights offerings in Britain are underwritten by 
investment banks. In such an offering, the issuer's existing shareholders are offered new shares 
on a pro rata basis; indeed under the Companies Act, subject to exceptions, a company's present 
shareholders have a preemptive right to purchase prorated portions of any new issuance of 
shares. See Companies Act, 1985, § 89. In general, large rights issues require the approval of the 
company's existing shareholders. Although shareholders tend to vote to approve rights offerings, 
they may not subscribe the offer fully. For example, the recent rights offering by WPP to finance 
its offer for JWT Group (a United States advertising firm) was only 35% subscribed. See 
Heleniak & Spera, supra, at 38, col. 1. Even given the likely need to obtain shareholder approval 
for the rights offering, British issuers appear to be able within a twenty-day period to conduct a 
shareholder meeting to approve a rights issue and to gain an unconditional commitment for the 
offering's proceeds from an underwriter. The twenty-day period is significant for acquisitions in 
the United States because under the SEC's rules it is the minimum duration for a tender offer. 
British securities regulation imposes disclosure obligations on issuers, but in key respects they 
are less onerous in this setting than the SEC's counterpart requirements. The issuer of the rights 
must describe the business of its acquisition target and present summary financial statements for 
it. These disclosure obligations generally can be satisfied with informatio,n available about the 
target from public sources, such ·as its annual reports. For a more extensive discussion of these 
matters, see id. at 38. 
As this discussion illustrates, circumstances that are simply the consequences of particular 
regulatory regimes should not be confused with circumstances that stem from the inevitable 
effects of economic behavior. Comparative analysis of legal institutions and practices often alle-
viates such confusion. 
8. See Poterba, supra note 4, at 497. 
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yield enhanced savings.9 Further, consumption may be enhanced if 
persons perceive financial assets as increasingly risky uses for their dis-
cretionary income. Events like the October 19 collapse cause most 
investors to perceive differential risks among types of financial assets, 
and probably cause some individuals to forgo additional investment in 
financial assets in favor of uses for discretionary income that have im-
mediate and tangible rewards. 
The analysis in Finance and Industrial Performance may omit the 
savings rate question because it concludes that the prospective benefits 
of a universal payout rule greatly exceed the costs of implementing it. 
Studies (most a bit long in the tooth) of industries with histories of 
inferior investment performance suggest that gains as great as twenty 
percent could be achieved by moving funds out of firms within those 
groups (p. 388). More conservative estimates are of a several percent 
difference in annual rates of return on marginal projects of firms 
within these groups and firms outside them, while the approximate 
cost of moving funds through outside financial intermediaries is 0.25% 
to 0.45% of the amount moved (p. 389). But even if one indulged 
optimistic estimates about probable results within these ranges, leak-
age of funds through shareholder consumption is a noteworthy 
concern. 
Additionally, the attack on overretention of earnings in Finance 
and Industrial Performance is undermined by a further key omission. 
In recent years, many corporate transactions other than routine divi-
dends liberated retained earnings through distributions to sharehold-
ers.10 Corporate share repurchases, management buyouts, and 
leveraged recapitalizations - all of which achieve this effect - in ag-
gregate terms distributed large amounts of cash to United States 
shareholders in recent years. In 1985, nondividend cash payments to 
shareholders amounted to $125 billion, almost fifty percent more than 
total dividends. 11 Finance and Industrial Performance comes closest to 
9. See Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, 48 LAW & CON· 
TEMP. PROBS. 77, 90 (Autumn 1985). 
10. Interestingly enough, a footnote in Finance and Industrial Performance defines "divi-
dend" broadly, as including "all methods by which a corporation transfers money from its treas-
ury to shareholders." P. 339 n.*. But the significance and recent magnitude of nondividend 
distributions are not considered. 
11. See J. SHOVEN, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE FINANCE AND TAX AVOIDANCE: 
SOME EVIDENCE 11 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2091, 1986). 
Shoven's study suggests that firms did not generate the cash to fund these transactions by reduc-
ing dividends. Id. at 25. Rather, internal cash generated in the corporate sector between 1981 
and 1985 increased enough to account for the equity absorbed through these transactions. Id. 
And the data, in Shoven's view, lends weak support to the hypothesis that firms incurred debt to 
generate the funds to absorb equity so as to achieve target leverage ratios. Id. at 25-27. Shaven 
concludes that these transactions may well have been motivated by "tax minimizing behavior." 
Id. at 33. Most of the cash received by shareholders when a company repurchases its own shares 
is a return of basis, which is not taxed, and accrued capital gains (represented by shares that are 
not repurchased) enjoy a tax deferral advantage. Further, if the firm substitutes debt for equity 
after a share repurchase, it achieves tax savings through the deductibility of its interest payments 
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addressing these transactions in its explanation of the inadequacy of 
the threat of hostile takeover as a check on a corporation's manage-
ment (pp. 65-68). But this discussion wholly ignores the work of fi-
nancial theorists, most prominently Michael Jensen, who argue that 
management buyouts and leveraged recapitalizations are market-gen-
erated solutions to precisely the problem of management's propensity 
to overretain. 12 
These transactions may well have consequences that are signifi-
cantly different from routine dividend distributions for the availability 
of funds to finance innovative projects. Firms that undergo these 
transactions tend in the aggregate to become more highly leveraged; 
that is, there is a substitution of debt for equity in the firm's capital 
structure. Between 1980 and 1985, the percentage of the source of 
funds of nonfinancial corporations attributed to debt instruments grew 
from 23.4% to 33.9% while domestic undistributed profits, as a source 
offunds, dropped from 15.4% to 3.7% and net new equity issues from 
3.7% to -16.9%. 13 Debt, especially in substantial amounts, restricts 
the debtor's discretion in its use of cash flows; thus it is not inconceiv-
able that, in the aggregate, these transactions reduce firm expenditures 
on new projects. Closely related, of course, is the use shareholders 
make of the cash they receive through nondividend distributions. 
They may choose to save and reinvest it at a greater or lesser rate than 
they do routine dividends, 14 perhaps due in part to the differential tax 
treatment of ordinary income and capital gains under our income tax 
laws. 15 Indeed, despite its 1987 publication date, Finance and Indus-
on the debt. Id. at 33-34. See generally Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. 
REV. 1039 (1987). 
Following the market collapse on October 19, more than 1400 companies announced plans to 
buy back shares valued at more than $80 billion. More than 2.4 billion shares will be absorbed 
and removed from the market if all of these announced repurchase plans are completed. See 
Salwen, Share Buy-Back Plans Proliferate, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1988, at SB, col. 4. Of course, the 
crash on average reduced the cost per share of repurchasing shares. For example, in September 
Citicorp sold $1.2 billion in stock at $58.25 per share. On October 20, with the stock's market 
price at $37.50, Citicorp announced its willingness to buy back up to five million shares. Id. 
12. See Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, in Papers 
and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
December 28-30, 1985, 76 AM. EcoN. REV., May 1986, at 323; Lehn & Poulsen, Sources of 
Value in Leveraged Buyouts (Feb. 8, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
13. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 387 (5th ed. 1987) (Table D-19. "Sources and Uses 
of Funds, Nonfarm, Nonfinancial Corporate Business, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1985"). 
14. See Summers & Carroll, supra note 3, at 621-23. Shoven's study, supra note 11, at 23-25, 
concludes that these payments supplemented rather than replaced dividend payments. Summers 
and Carroll characterize household use of this "extra cash" as an open question, but report their 
suspicion that substantial consumption funded by these payments has occurred recently, perhaps 
at a significant enough rate to cause the personal and private savings rates to fall between one and 
two percentage points. See Summers & Carroll, supra note 3, at 623. 
15. Tax economists disagree as to the likely impact of changes in the rate at which capital 
gains income is taxed. See Gravelle, Will Reducing Capital Gains Taxes Raise Revenues?, 36 
TAX NOTES 419 (1987). It is nonetheless a plausible assumption that taxes, including those on 
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trial Performance fails to note that the changes in relative individual 
and corporate income tax rates wrought by the 1986 tax reform legis-
lation eliminate any tax-driven incentive to incorporate or, for that 
matter, to retain earnings.16 
Most regrettably, the book's study of the semiconductor industry 
ends in 1974. The next thirteen years were eventful ones for this in-
dustry, and I suspect that useful work could be done in examining the 
relationship between these events and the availability of finance to the 
industry, in particular to its most innovative segments. Yet even if 
history between 1974 and 1987 repeated history through 1974, it is far 
from obvious why we would only be interested in knowing the story 
up to 1974. 
In any event, to premise significant policy changes on a study of 
one industry raises a number of questions, none of which is addressed 
by this book. Is the industry typical in a relevant sense? Or if not 
typical, is it important for other reasons? Cross-sectional and aggre-
gate data would also surely be helpful in assessing the need for policy 
change. Do firms in industries characterized by a relatively high level 
of product innovation have similar capital structures that differentiate 
them from participants in other industries? And surely one would not 
confine the study, however formulated, to data ending in 1974. This 
point is illustrated by the semiconductor industry itself. 
In its first twenty-five years, the United States semiconductor in-
dustry grew at a spectacular rate. Semiconductors are manufactured 
devices that modify electrical signals, and the industry grew with the 
invention of ever-more complex devices that integrated multiple elec-
tronic functions into single semiconductor devices. Sales increased 
from $90 million in 1956 to $1.8 billion in 1973, and between 1957 and 
1972, the number of semiconductor units sold increased thirty-five-
fold. Throughout this era, the industry had "distinct organizational 
characteristics" (p. 254). It was relatively concentrated, but industry 
domination by major tube manufacturers declined progressively. New 
successful firms continued to enter the industry, and firms' relative 
rankings fluctuated. These characteristics stemmed from the rapid 
rate of technological change in the industry and its relatively low entry 
capital gains, affect international flows of capital. See Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Sav-
ings in a World Economy, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 1086 (1986). 
16. Under the Tax Reform Act, in 1988 the top corporate rate (34%) will be higher than the 
top individual rate (28% ). These rate differentials should stimulate distributions to shareholders 
to the extent corporations choose between retention and distribution so as to minimize taxes and 
maximize their shareholders' wealth. If a corporation retains earnings, it would continue to pay 
tax at the higher corporate rate on the earnings' yield. The continuing corporate tax on yield 
would exceed the tax cost of the immediate tax (at individual rates) paid by shareholders when 
they receive a dividend. One recent study estimated that the changes in personal and corporate 
taxation resulting from the 1986 Reform Act might depress corporate saving by more than one 
percent of net national product by 1989, a change that would only partly be offset by changes in 
private savings. See Poterba, supra note 4, at 503. 
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barriers.17 Although large established firms were responsible for most 
of the industry's technological advances, newer firms "seem[ ed] more 
willing to try a new technology" and gradually came to dominate the 
market (p. 257). 
Survival in the semiconductor industry during this era depended 
on firms' ability to implement innovations quickly. During the subse-
quent life of the innovative product, the firms that initially produced it 
dominated the market. Firms tended to view their retained earnings 
as a source of cheap finance and thus a firm's profit position, derived 
from prior successes, enhanced the likelihood that it would invest in a 
new innovation. 
The types of new products in which firms invested differed, how-
ever, depending on the firm's nature. Diversified electronics manufac-
turers tended to invest in innovations with internal end uses as 
components in other more complex products manufactured by the 
firm, lending a conservative bias to the pattern of their investments. 
Smaller firms, in contrast, -funded more innovative products. Despite 
these divergent patterns, the study in Finance and Industrial Perform-
ance does not demonstrate that managers in the larger diversified firms 
invested in projects that were such suboptimal uses of retained earn-
ings that their projected rate of return was less than the firm's cost of 
capital. There may be, as the book observes, "good theoretical and 
empirical reasons to believe that some firms are investing in projects 
inferior in predicted return to some projects that go unfunded" (p. 
338). But the semiconductor study does not support a conclusion that 
firms in that industry used retained earnings to fund projects with a 
lower projected return than alternative investments available on aver-
age to firm shareholders for reinvestment of funds distributed to them 
as dividends. That some worthy projects go unfunded does not, of 
course, establish that on average shareholders' reinvested dividends 
would find their way to ventures promising higher returns than the 
projects actually funded. 
Another striking characteristic of the semiconductor industry is 
the mobility of engineers, designers, and managers, in many instances 
from established firms to "spinoff" ventures. Finance and Industrial 
Performance characterizes the spinoff phenomenon as a symptom of 
inadequacy in the industry's financing practices: "A spin-off repre-
sents a failure on the part of the internal finance process of the spawn-
ing firm," because its managers failed to recognize the value of the 
17. P. 257. Indeed, given these organizational traits, one might well wonder how typical the 
semiconductor industry is. Do other industries that appear to generate a large number of innova-
tive products - biotechnology, financial services, consumer electronics, advanced weaponry -
share similar organizational characteristics? But perhaps the semiconductor industry, even if not 
typical, is highly significant for other reasons. Its product innovations may enable the down-
stream development of innovative products in industries that use semiconductors as components. 
Finance and Industrial Performance neither asks nor answers these questions. 
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project proponents' proposal, which ultimately received funding 
through an outside source (p. 310). Events subsequent to 1974, how-
ever, suggest that this description is insensitive to the culture of the 
industry itself and not especially helpful in explaining the industry's 
later evolution. 
After 1974, many product lines within the semiconductor industry 
came to be substantially dominated by Japanese producers. The in-
dustry worldwide scrambled to develop lowest-cost production 
processes, and sales and profitability within the industry became noto-
riously cyclical. 18 At present in the United States, however, the fast-
est-growing market segment is "niche" products, that is, the design 
and production of application-specific semiconductors. This phase in 
the United States industry's development has been supported by a ver-
itable "flood" of venture capital.19 Of significant support also is the 
mobility of semiconductor designers, programmers, and marketers, 
who readily join start-up ventures. 20 The industry seems populated 
with restless individuals who value highly the opportunity to join a 
company designed to showcase their abilities. Indeed one prominent 
venture capitalist, Arthur Rock, who invested in several preeminent 
semiconductor firms, wrote recently that "[t]he biggest problem in 
starting high-tech businesses is the shortage of superior managers. 
There is too much money chasing too few good managers."21 
In any event, recent experience suggests that the survival of the 
United States semiconductor industry turns on its present ability to 
develop niche products suited to an increasingly fragmented market so 
as to flourish in the highly design-intensive albeit low volume end of 
the business. 22 If so, existing firms' generation of spinoff firms signifies 
not "failure" but a crucial mode of organizational adaptation. Also 
small semiconductor firms increasingly ally themselves with very large 
diversified corporations, exchanging, for equity capital and easier ac-
cess to bank financing, access to cutting-edge technology and preferen-
tial supply of product in tight supply markets.23 And over eighty 
percent of semiconductor assembly by United States firms now takes 
18. See Kotkin, The Third Wave, INC., Feb. 1984, at 57. 
19. Id. at 62. 
20. See id. at 66 (reporting industry accusations that venture capitalists play the role of 
Darth Vader, "luring innocent young engineers and managers to the 'dark side' of en· 
trepreneurial capitalism"). 
21. Rock, Strategy vs. Tacticsfrom a Venture Capitalist, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1987, 
at 63, 66. As it happens, officials of Arthur Rock & Co. were interviewed by the author of 
Finance and Industrial Performance in 1974. P. 245 n. 1. See also M. Fox, The Role of Finance 
in Industrial Organization: A General Theory and the Case of the Semiconductor Industry 187 n.1 
(Ph.D. Diss., Yale Univ. 1980). 
22. See Arnold, Customizing a Market Can Put You in the Chips, ELEC. Bus., Mar. 1984, at 
102; Kotkin, supra note 18. 
23. See Kotkin, The Age of Alliances, INC., Feb. 1984, at 68. 
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place offshore.24 A study of the significance of finance to the United 
States industry's various modes of adaptation to changes in technol-
ogy, labor costs, and product markets would be of value, but regretta-
bly Finance and Industrial Peiformance does not undertake it. 
24. See Davis & Hatano, The American Semiconductor Industry and the Ascendancy of East 
Asia, 27 CAL. MGMT. REV. 128, 129 (Summer 1985). 
